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DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN LAW
OF CORPORATIONS TO 1832
Douglas Arner*
HIS article began life almost ten years ago as an essay for Profes-
sor Joe McKnight's American Legal History course at SMU. De-
spite the topic not being one of his major interests, Prof. McKnight
very generously provided guidance, sources from his collection of rare
books, and comments on successive drafts, both while the author was a
student and after. In addition to his own time and expertise, Prof. MC
Knight allowed the author far more time than he really deserved in which
to complete the initial work. It is therefore very appropriate that this
piece be included in a tribute to Prof. McKnight, as it clearly demon-
strates the effect that he has had on the career and scholarship of those
who have known him and studied under his direction. Further, it illus-
trates a significant aspect of legal history which the author has come to
appreciate: the fact that it changes slowly!
Significantly, over the past ten years, the role of corporate or company
law and its importance for economic development has come under in-
creasing scrutiny, especially as previously centrally-planned economies
move towards market-based systems and as countries have focused more
on the role of law and legal and institutional infrastructure in supporting
financial development and economic growth.' Private business corpora-
tions are a vital aspect of a market economy, and analysis of the law's role
in their development aids others attempting to develop functioning cor-
porations and financial markets. Despite the usefulness of comparative
historical analysis for contemporary economic transition, little study has
* BA (Drury), JD (SMU), LLM (London). Assistant Professor & Deputy Director,
Asian Institute of International Financial Law, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong
Kong. Special thanks to Prof. Joseph McKnight of SMU, Phillip Smart of University of
Hong Kong, and Prof. John Farrar of Bond University for their time and comments and to
Misty Redfield and the staff of the SMU Law Review for managing to include this piece at
a very late date.
1. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law
and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1 (2001); R. LA
PORTA, F. LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, A. SHLEIFER & R. VISHNY, INVESTOR PROTECTION AND
CORPORATE VALUATION (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W7403,
1999); Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001); Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separa-
tion of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459 (2001); and
J. Norton & D. Arner, Development of Capital Markets, Stock Exchanges and Securities
Regulation in Transition Economies, in TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES: BANKING, FINANCE,
INSTITUTIONS, ch. 4 (Yelena Kalyuzhnova & Michael Taylor, eds., St. Martin's Press 2001).
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been devoted to early development of corporate law in the United States
and the United Kingdom, despite the fact that the Anglo-American
model of corporate structure and governance has become the paradigm
to which other countries aspire. Much of early U.S. corporate law (which
began as state law, and today remains state law, albeit with a very influen-
tial overlay of federal regulation of corporations issuing securities) is de-
rived from English sources; however, formal recognition of the legal
foundations of business corporations developed earlier in the U.S. than in
England.2 Moreover, the law governing the behavior of corporations issu-
ing securities to the public has remained more developed to the present
in the United States than in the United Kingdom. The combination of
early recognition of the fundamental legal supports to business corpora-
tions and the development of separate and comprehensive regulation of
those companies issuing securities to the public may underlie the earlier
development of the Berle and Means corporation 3 (characterized by dis-
persed ownership and separation of ownership and control) in the United
States than in the United Kingdom or any other jurisdiction. The early
development of the private business corporation in the United States is
then a matter of some importance, especially as it diverges from the early
British practice.
Specifically, this article addresses development of the fundamental le-
gal attributes generally attributed to modern corporations, 4 prior to the
development of general incorporation statutes in the United States and
specifically suggests that the essential components were established by
1832 and crystallized with the publication of the first treatise on the law
respecting corporations in the United States.5
This article is divided into three principal sections in an effort to reflect
the major stages of the development of private business corporation law
in the United States. Section I discusses the early development of corpo-
rate law, with primary focus on the early development of the joint stock
company in England before approximately 1800. Section II addresses the
period of transition and development of the law of business corporations
2. See generally, RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP
AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 1720-1844 (Cambridge 2000); ScoTT R. BOWMAN, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: LAW, POWER, AND lI)EOL-
oGy (PA St. Univ. Pres. 1996); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSI-
NESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 (Univ. Press of VA
1970); L.C.B. Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69
HARv. L. REV. 1369 (1956). Note that in the English practice private business corpora-
tions as known in the United States practice are called "companies," and are organized
under specific company statutes governing their various aspects. See also C. A. COOKE,
CORPORATION, TRUST AND COMPANY: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL HISTORY, 127-190 (1950); AR-
MAND BUDINGTON DuBois, THE ENGLISH BUSINESS COMPANY AFIER THE BUBBLE ACT,
1720-1800 (Octagon Books 1938).
3. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Macmillan Co. 1933).
4. See generally, Gower, supra note 2, and COOKE, supra note 2, for a discussion of
the modern attributes of the corporate form.
5. JOSEPH K. ANGELL AND SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS AGGREGATE (reprint, N.Y. Arno Press 1972) (1832).
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in the United States from 1776 to approximately 1832. Section III dis-
cusses the state of business corporation law in 1832 at the time of the
publication of the first treatise on the law of private business corporations
in the U.S.
I. THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS LAW PRIOR TO 1776
The exact origins of the corporate form are not precisely known; how-
ever, the form dates back at least to the time of the Roman Empire al-
though its use for private business purposes is probably considerably
more recent. Blackstone attributed the invention of private corporations
to a Roman, Numa Pompilius. According to Blackstone, Pompilius cre-
ated the fiction of artificial corporate bodies in an effort to subdivide fac-
tions of Sabines and Romans into separate entities to prevent continued
civil strife; the idea apparently was that if the two groups could effectively
govern and view themselves independently and separately, then perhaps
they might cease to kill one another with such frequency. 6 Angell and
Ames, however, believed that the corporation traces back at least to the
Greeks, who appear to have copied the corporate form from the laws of
Solon, which apparently allowed licensing private corporations so long as
obedient to the state.7 Further, with the exception of the concept of lim-
ited liability, Angell and Ames felt that corporations in the United States
at the time of the publication of their treatise very closely resembled
those of the Romans,8 and in fact the Romans used the essential division
of corporations that Angell and Ames themselves used in 1832: ecclesias-
tical and lay, eleemosynary and civil.9
The practice of incorporating bodies of persons composing particular
trades, including merchants embarking on commercial ventures, dates
from the times of Solon and Numa Pompilius, and probably continued
throughout the intervening time in England, although most early devel-
opment seems to have stemmed from the needs of towns rather than
from the needs of merchants. 10 Angell and Ames, however, cited the cre-
ation of a company of Burgundian merchants called the "Merchant Ad-
venturers" as early as 1248.11 As the needs of the municipal corporation
grew more complex, merchant guilds developed to control the right to
6. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *471; Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
7. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 5, at 26-27.
8. "It has been considered that the corporations of our own time which more nearly
resemble those of the Romans, are they which have been created in different parts of the
United States by charters that impose upon each member a personal responsibility for the
company debts, which, in that respect, resemble an ordinary copartnership." Id. at 28.
9. Id. at 29.
10. Id. at 30. According to Cooke, commercial corporate life in England began in the
towns during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries as towns sought independence from
fuedal, ecclesiastical, and political control. Charters developed as towns sought the right to
control their own political and economic development. COOKE, supra note 2.
11. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 5, at 31. Cooke, however, suggested that this incor-
poration of merchants was not actually incorporated as the "Company of Merchant Ad-
venturers" until 1505. COOKE, supra note 2, at 34.
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trade free of tolls within the municipality, though at least through the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, these guilds did not assume any direct
trading function. 12 Guilds were governed through a council somewhat
akin to a board of directors, and while at this time the guilds were not
pursuing joint ventures, they did act to achieve a common purpose: con-
trol of trade within their jurisdiction.1 3 Following the rise of these general
monopoly guilds, guilds began to subdivide into crafts guilds, each reflect-
ing a specific trade within a given town, signaling further differentiation
of the purposes of early English corporations. 14 As early as 1437, these
guilds and their ordinances had to be registered with and approved by the
town wherein they were established.' 5 By the fifteenth and sixteenth cen-
turies, the crafts guild and the borough were distinct in function with the
borough or municipal corporation acting as an organ of government
while the crafts guild was an economic asset for the benefit of its mem-
bers, although legally the two were almost identical. 16 According to
Cooke, by the sixteenth century, the country as a whole was an economic
unit for political purposes, with corporate forms existing as subordinate
institutions serving national purposes, and with the central government
reaching out to control both the municipalities and the guilds through
statutes and new charters establishing the control of the central
authority. 17
Angell and Ames suggested the early division of these economic com-
panies was into two classes: (1) regulated companies and (2) joint stock
companies. 18 Regulated companies were essentially state chartered mo-
nopolies for the pursuit of some interest beneficial to the state (such as
foreign trade), and they have apparently existed in London and parts of
Europe since at least 1566.19 Joint stock companies, as described, more
closely resembled the modern form of business corporation, in that they
are "composed of persons who seldom know any thing of the business of
the company, but who leave the management of it entirely to a body of
directors, and are contented with receiving such dividends as the directors
12. COOKE, supra note 2, at 22-23. This is probably the origin of the early association
of incorporation with monopoly powers.
13. Id. at 24.
14. Id. at 26-27. These guilds evolved to reflect the needs of towns to develop through
trade and commerce, but were still based on the monopoly form.
15. 15 H. VI, c. 6 (1437); 19 H. VII, c. 7 (1504), "De Privatis & Illicitis Statutis non
Faciendis." These early statutes were an attempt to ensure that all actions of such corpora-
tions were in accord with the general law, thus indicating that even though such corpora-
tions were free to govern their own actions within their jurisidiction, their rights did not
exceed or infringe upon those generally available. See COOKE, supra note 2, at 30-31.
16. Id. at 31.
17. Id. at 33-35. These were voluntary bodies with the right to plead and be im-
pleaded, hold property, and have a common seal, and because of the existence of these
early corporate attributes can be seen as the ancestors of the joint stock company. Id.
18. Angell and Ames may have taken this division from Adam Smith who used the
same general divisions in his own classifications. See infra, sections 1I & Il1.
19. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 5, at 32.
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think proper to make." 20
Joint stock companies appear to have been the result of the gradual
development of a class of wealthy merchants and property owners over
time. These individuals combined their resources to undertake some ven-
ture beyond their individual means and tolerance for risk, and signaled
the development of a new form of corporate venture clearly different
from the early towns and guilds.2t Overall, this development reflected the
general expansion of markets and an increasing use of capital as the basis
of business, rather than merely the skills of craftsmen as predominated
during the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries. These wealthy
merchants were important in the development of the idea of capital and
its uses in that, unlike the older classes whose wealth was based on prop-
erty, their wealth was based on accumulation of gold and other forms of
treasure approximating money at the time.22 Cooke suggested that the
growth of the joint stock company was not so much the result of a few
wealthy merchants and property owners investing excess rents, but rather
was based on a large number of smaller successful tradesmen who had
certain excess wealth, but neither the time nor the money for business on
a large scale. 23 If this was in fact the case, it may explain the rapid devel-
opment of the corporate form in the United States two hundred years
later, with its large number. of independent businessmen and property
owners who did not yet possess significant accumulations of excess
wealth.
During the second half of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries,
the needs of trade and the existence of this pool of capital came together
with the corporate form to emerge as the joint stock company. The firm
as such came to be seen as a separate accounting entity from its underly-
ing investors, predicated upon the development of the system of double
entry accounting.24 Major trading corporations developed over a period
of approximately two hundred years and reflected an overall shift from
medieval commerce to the modern form of shares in ongoing enterprises
and free transferability through the mechanism of the stock market.
20. Id. at 32. The authors date banks of this form to Europe as early as 1401 with the
establishment of a Table of Exchange in Barcelona.
21. See COOKE, supra note 2, at 36-37.
22. Id. at 39-41. Cooke suggests that liquidity of such investments was necessary to the
evolution of the joint stock form in England; however, others have suggested that such
transferability was in fact not a characteristic of the American form until the late nine-
teenth century. See Alfred F. Conard, Cook and the Corporate Shareholder: A Belated
Review of William W. Cook's Publications on Corporations, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1724, 1730-
31 (1995).
23. In fact, it was not clear until the sixteenth century that a business could have a
capital value at all. A necessary development at this time then was the limitation of usury
laws, allowing businesses to borrow funds to finance operations. Until this was allowed,
loans were impossible due to general prohibitions on interest and the impossibility of valu-
ing the business against which they were being taken. COOKE, supra note 2, at 42-43.
24. Id. at 47-48. Merchant adventures required large amounts of capital and entailed
equally large risks of loss, as well as the need to wait sometimes years for any commercial
success. Double entry accounting made this possible and seems to have developed around
1608. Id.
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Charters were also granted as a means of furthering sovereign goals of
increasing trade, but without the government being responsible for the
risks thereof or for the outlay of large amounts of capital. 25 At this time,
charters were seen to be granted in exchange for the public benefits asso-
ciated with the possibility of large combinations of capital in areas of gov-
ernment interest.26 As these ventures developed from the needs of a
single voyage, to that of combinations for numerous voyages, to perma-
nent enterprises represented by company assets governed by a select
group of shareholders, the joint stock company of the eighteenth century
began to appear. 27
A. DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH LAW: CORPORATE ATTRIBUTES
1. Coke and the Case of Sutton's Hospital
The Case of Sutton's Hospital in 1612 is generally regarded as one of
the most important early cases on corporations.2 8 While the case deals
with a private incorporated charity (a hospital), it lays down the attrib-
utes that defined the corporate form, including that of the private busi-
25. Major companies incorporated during this period included the Merchant Adven-
turers (later known as the Hamburg Company), the East India Company, the Eastland
Company, the Russia Company, the Levant Company, the Africa Company, the Hudson's
Bay Company, the French Company, the Spanish Company, and the South Sea Company.
Id. While free transferability of shares was already an important facet of the joint stock
company in England at this time, shares in corporations in the United States were appar-
ently not fully transferable until the twentieth century. See WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREA-
TISE ON TI-IE LAW OF STrOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS 417-18 (Baker Voorhis & Co. 1887)
(shares emphatically nontransferable in the United States in 1887); Uniform Stock Transfer
Act (1909) in C. Terry, Uniform State Laws in the United States Fully Annotated 339-54
(1920); ALl, National Conference of Commissioner's on Uniform State Law for the Uni-
form Commercial Code (1957). See generally Francis T. Christy, Responsibilities in the
Transfer of Stock, 53 MIcH L. REV. 701 (1955); Alfred F. Conard, A New Deal for Fiducia-
ries' Stock Transfers, 56 MICH. L. REV. 843 (1958). Given the stock market boom in the
United States in the 1920s, however, stock was obviously transferable albeit with some risk,
despite certain commentators assertions to the contrary. See Alfred F. Conard, Cook and
the Corporate Shareholder: A Belated Review of William W. Cook's Publications on Corpo-
rations, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1730-31 (1995).
26. COOKE, supra note 2, at 49. Note that this public benefit was seen as essential
even to incorporation in the United States in 1832. See infra, part Ill.
27. Id. at 49-50. The Merchant Adventurers of Newcastle-on-Tyne used the word
"joint-stock" in documents for the first time in 1554; however, the extention of the system
into an opportunity for the general public first arose with the East India Company. In the
1617 voyage to the Indies, 1,500,000 pounds sterling was invested by nearly a thousand
subscribers, including fifteen earls and dukes, eighty-two privy councillors, judges and
knights, thirteen countesses and ladies of rank, eighteen widows and maiden ladies,
twenty-six clergymen, three hundred and thirteen merchants, two hundred and fourteen
tradesmen, and twenty-five merchant strangers. Id. at 57-58. See John Keay, The
Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company (HarperCollins
1993), esp. 25-29 & 99-101 (discussing evolution of the corporate structure of the English
East India Company).
Williston suggests that by 1720 upwards of 200 joint stock companies had been formed;
however, at this time most of these joint stock companies were not in fact incorporated.
Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L.
REV. 105, part I (1888) (citing Anderson, And. Hist. Com., vol. i at 291 et seq., vol. ii at 296
(1st ed.)).
28. 5 Co. Rep. 23 (1526-1616), reprinted at 285 (1826).
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ness corporation, at least up to the time of Angell and Ames in 1832.
Essentially, the case arose out of a conflict over the question of the valid-
ity of a bequest to Sutton's hospital between the family members not ben-
efiting from the devise of the estate and the beneficiary corporation. In
Sutton's Hospital, the plaintiff family members argued that (1) there was
in fact no incorporation; (2) if there was an incorporation, Sutton had
acted outside his permissible authority; and (3) the bargain and sale in
question were void due to either or both of these circumstances. 2 9 De-
spite the later importance attached to this case, Coke himself indicated
that neither the decision nor the arguments were worthwhile. 30 At the
end of the case, however, Coke stated three reasons why he reported the
case: (1) for the confirmation of incorporations founded for works of
piety and charity in times past; (2) for the better instruction of how incor-
poration should occur thereafter so that no exception might be taken
from the rules laid down; and (3) for resolving certain opinions and ques-
tions which were moved at the bar and which might have disturbed the
state of the law, thereby avoiding certain future disputes.31 As evidence
of the success of Coke's intentions, this case has been used as the general
model for all following corporate explications at least up to 1832.32
Coke began his analysis with a principle, which later became very im-
portant to corporate law: "because this case chiefly depends upon the
letters patent, . . . the best exposition of the King's charter is upon the
consideration of the whole charter, to expound the charter by the charter
itself .... ,33 In other words, the powers of the corporation and the inter-
pretation thereof came primarily from the charter of the corporation it-
self. Accordingly, Coke went on to analyze the charter (as defined by the
letters patent) at some length, finding it in fact to be a valid charter
granted by the King.34
Of central importance in the opinion, Coke listed what he believed to
be the essence of a corporation.35 To that end, Coke listed five factors: (1)
lawful authority of incorporation; (2) persons to be incorporated; (3) a
name by which they are incorporated; (4) a place of incorporation; and
(5) by means of words sufficient in law to indicate the intent to create a
corporation.36 According to Coke, there were only four ways by which a
corporation could be created: (1) by common law, as by the King himself;
(2) by the authority of Parliament; (3) by the King himself through a
29. Id. at 287.
30. "Which brief report I have made of these objections, because I think them, or the
greater part of them, were not worthy to be moved at the bar, nor remembered at the
bench . I..." Id  at 289. Others, however, who disagreed with Coke's analysis, thought that
it was based at least partially on bias against the plaintiffs and their counsel.
31. Id. at 34b.
32. See, e.g., Sheppard, Blackstone, Kyd, and Angell and Ames, discussed infra.
33. 5 Co. Rep. at 34b. The "letters patent" were the device used by the King in the
incorporation of Sutton's hospital.
34. Id. at 24b-28a.




charter; and (4) by prescription. 37 The persons involved could be both
natural or "bodies incorporate and political, '38 indicating that at least as
of 1612, corporations could be part of other corporations.
According to Coke, if a corporation was duly created, certain incidents
automatically attached, without the need to detail them in the charter
itself.39 In analyzing the clauses the of the charter itself, Coke listed sev-
eral automatic incidents: (1) "the authority, ability, and capacity to
purchase"; (2) to "sue and be sued, implead and be impleaded"; (3) to
have and use a corporate seal; (4) "survivors will be the corporate," i.e.
perpetual succession; (5) to be visited by the governors, etc., i.e. that
those giving the charter may in fact "visit" the corporation in order to
determine that it is performing as intended; and (6) to make ordinances
for its own governance and of those within its authority.40 Coke described
clauses detailing freedom from visitation by the ordinary, a license to
purchase in mortmain, and the direction of future revenues as useful for
the purposes intended for the corporation at issue, but neither necessary
nor an automatic incident of every corporation.41 Finally, Coke stated
that a clause restricting alienation and devise is "but a precept, and doth
not bind in law."'4 2 In other words, statements within the charter do not
override external law, so that while a corporation is responsible for its
own internal governance, the existence of a corporate charter does not
equate with complete freedom from the power of government.
Sutton's Hospital is often cited for the proposition that corporations
cannot be charged for certain actions for which natural persons may be
charged: "[F]or a corporation aggregate of many is invisible, immortal,
and rests only in intendment and consideration of the
law. . .[corporations] cannot commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor ex-
communicate, for they have no souls, neither can they appear in person,
but by attorney. '43 The case is also often cited for the proposition that
"none but the King alone can create or make a corporation. .. ,44 Else-
where, as previously stated, Coke listed four manners in which a corpora-
tion may be created, and in fact the statement that corporations could
only be created by charter should not be attributed to Coke in Sutton's
Hospital because one of Coke's stated purposes in reporting the case was
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 30b. Note that nowhere does Coke indicate that the charter cannot be with-
drawn at the insistence of those giving it. Further, the automatic right of visitation may in





43. Id. at 32b. Commentators have criticized this characterization as inaccurate and
damaging to later legal development for centuries. See Amasa M. Eaton, The First Book in
English on the Law of Incorporation, 12 YALE L.J. 259 (1903); Samuel Williston, History of
the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105, part 1 (1888).
44. 5 Co. Rep. at 33b.
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to affirm the status of incorporation of earlier non-chartered charitable
corporations.
2. Sheppard and Of Corporations, Fraternities and Guilds
The first English book on the law of corporations, that of William
Sheppard, was published in London in 1659.45 Sheppard is more famous
for another volume, The Touchstone of Common Assurances, published
in London in 1641, and rescued from oblivion by Lord Chief Justice Wil-
les.46 By profession, Sheppard was a country lawyer; however, he gained
his knowledge of corporations from 1656-59 as one of four clerks ap-
pointed by the Lord Protector, Richard Cromwell, to draw up charters to
municipal corporations. 47 After Cromwell's fall, Sheppard also fell into
disfavor, and Eaton suggests that this may in fact be the reason that his
book on corporations became so obscure. 48
Sheppard's book, entitled Of Corporations, Fraternities, and Guilds,
treated municipal corporations principally but made no real distinction
between the various other types of corporations. 49 Sheppard defined a
corporation as "a body in fiction of Law, or, a body Politick that indureth
in perpetual (succession)."'50 Sheppard went on to say:
A Corporation is a body politick, Authorized by the Lord Protector's
Charter, to have a Common Seal, Head Officer, or officers and
Members; all which together are able by their Common consent to
grant, give, receive, or take any thing within the Compass of their
Charter, or to sue, and be sued, as any one man may do, or be.5
1
Sheppard delineated corporations into the same types later used by
both Blackstone and Angell, i.e., sole and aggregate, ecclesiastical and
lay, eleemosynary and civil, that both Eaton and Williston, among others,
later criticize as artificial.52 Following Coke, in Sutton's Hospital,53 Shep-
pard stated that a corporation may be created through the same four
methods described by Coke54 and then described the essential require-
45. WILLIAM SHEPPARD, OF CORPORATIONS, FRATERNITIES, AND GUILDS (Garland
Pub., Inc. 1978) (1659). See Eaton, supra note 43 (discussing Sheppard).
46. Eaton, supra note 43, at 260-61. In fact, there appears to be some confusion as to
whether Sheppard actually wrote Touchstone. See id.
47. Id. at 259.
48. Id. at 259-62. In fact, Eaton suggests that there may in fact have been two editions.
See id. at 260 n. 2 and accompanying text.
49. Eaton, supra note 45, at 263. Eaton suggests that this plainly indicates that "even
so late as 1659 the distinctions between [various types of corporations] were imperfectly
realized." Id.
50. SHEPPARD, supra note 45, at 1.
51. Id. at 4.
52. Id. at 2. See sources cited supra note 41.
53. See supra Part I, COKE, for discussion.
54. Eaton, supra note 45, at 272 (citing SHEPPARD, supra note 45 at 4-5). Eaton dis-
agrees with Coke that corporations could only be created with the King's charter. To sup-
port his viewpoint, he cited the first general incorporation act, 39 Eliz. ch. 5 and 21 Jas. I
ch. I, giving power to incorporate without the action of either King or Parliament. "Evi-
dently so late as 1659, although the act had been in force 62 years, its effect was not real-
ized by our writer." Id. at 275.
2002]
SMU LAW REVIEW
ments of incorporation exactly as Coke in Sutton's Hospital.55
Sheppard's description of the automatic incidents arising from incorpo-
ration likewise resembled that of Coke. As such, among things "declara-
tory or explanatory, and inserted only in point of discretion, and for
conveniency" are the following:
So the Clauses, to buy and sell, sue and be sued, have and use a
common Seal, to restrain alienation or demise of the Land belonging
to the Corporation. That the Survivors shall be Incorporate. That if
the Revenues increase, they shall be imployed to the publique use of
the Corporation. To be visited by the Governours. To make Ordi-
nances, That the Ordinary shall not visit it, License to purchase in
Mortmain, and some general Clauses and Provisoes. The Corpora-
tion is well made without all this. 56
According to Sheppard, however, certain things often inserted in char-
ters were in fact unlawful, including: (1) the making of ordinances for the
imprisonment of men; (2) the forfeiting of goods upon disobedience to
the internal rules created by the corporation for the governance of its
members; (3) the restraining of the liberty of trade; and (4) the re-
straining of the corporation from having what is automatically incident to
it.57 Following this analysis of what does not need to be in the charter or
is invalid if within the charter, Sheppard listed five requirements that
every charter must contain: (1) a name; (2) a place "to fix and bottom the
corporation"; (3) words to the effect that an incorporation is intended; (4)
persons to be incorporated; and (5) good and lawful authority to erect the
corporation.5 8
Interestingly, Sheppard's next section stated that charters were consid-
ered of very little account, in that corporations not only did not have to
include all of their powers therein but also that corporations often did not
follow their own charters - something of a divergence from the impor-
tance that Coke places upon the charter.5 9 Sheppard, at the end of his
treatise, following Coke, stated that a corporation "cannot commit Trea-
son, be Out-Law'd, Excommunicate, appear in person in a Court, be
Sworn, Dye, and other such like Acts which a natural body may do."'60
Finally, Sheppard states "[i]f a summe of money be to be levied upon a
55. Id. at 273-79 (citing SHEPPARD, supra note 45, at 10-23).
56. SHEPPARD, supra note 45, at 41-42.
57. Id. at 43-44. Eaton criticized Sheppard for failing to distinguish between royal
charters and parliamentary charters. According to Eaton, under English law, the courts
may adjudge certain actions of the King to be unlawful, but not so with actions of Parlia-
ment. Because of this, he suggests that a charter granted by Parliament is in fact more
valuable than a royal charter. Eaton, supra note 45, at 282. Sheppard's political bias as a
member of Cromwell's government clearly shows through in his evaluation of the two
types of charter grants.
58. SHEPPARD, supra note 45, at 6-23.
59. Eaton, supra note 45, at 284-85. Eaton was amazed by this discussion, especially in
light of Sheppard's otherwise strong resonance of Coke. Note, however, that Coke as ajudge was attempting to direct the law in the direction he felt appropriate, whereas Shep-
pard was more of a practitioner and an observer of what subsequently happened to the
corporate charters he was responsible for granting under Cromwell's authority.
60. SHEPPARD, supra note 45, at 109 (citing Coo.[sic] 10, Sutton's Hospital Case).
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Corporation, it may be levied upon the Mayor or chief Magistrate, or
upon any Member of the Corporation."' 61 Clearly, in Sheppard's time,
limited liability was not an incident of a corporation. 62
Overall, Sheppard's book, while the first English book on corporations
and one written by an acknowledged expert on the subject, does not re-
ally advance very much beyond Coke's opinion in Sutton's Hospital.
Sheppard's book does, however, illustrate the extent of Coke's influence
on the early law of corporations.
B. THE BUBBLE AcT OF 1720 AND LATER ENGLISH DEVELOPMENTS
In the last quarter of the seventeenth century, business in stock and
share dealings began to increase, not only in England but also in Paris
and Amsterdam, with the respective stock markets climbing to immense
heights before crashing again to almost nothing.63 Although generally re-
garded as a reaction to the confusion created by this in England, the Bub-
ble Act of 1720 was not actually enacted to deal with the rapidly
expanding boom, but rather to enable the English government, through
the mechanism of the South Sea Company, to further encourage the ex-
change of government debt into South Sea Company shares.64 Its result,
however, retarded the development of the private business corporation in
England for over one hundred years.
The Bubble Act of 172065 is divided into two parts: first, a grant of two
charters to corporations engaged in assurance of ships and in bottomry,
respectively; 66 and second, making any joint stock company operating
without a charter illegal under severe penalty.67 The first section is inter-
61. Id. at 126-27 (citing Rolls, C.J. in B.R. Hill (1652)).
62. Eaton suggests that this general liability is based upon the feudal duties that each
townsman, burgher, etc., owed to his feudal lord-namely, payment of feudal dues. Eaton,
supra note 45. Cooke, however, makes a clearer suggestion: essentially, general liability
was based on the ability of other corporations, whether municipalities, merchants, or
guilds, to charge any member of any corporation owing a debt with the full amount of the
debt owed by the corporation. In other words, general corporate liability was a response
to the needs of the time respecting the collection of debts. If one could not levy against the
specific individual incurring the debt, then one could levy against any one of his corporate
cohorts that might come within in reach. Seemingly, not only would this precipitate the
collection of debts owed by members of corporations, but would also encourage corpora-
tions to pressure their own members to pay their debts. See COOKE, supra note 2, at 25-27
(discussing the right of "withernam").
63. COOKE, supra note 2, at 80-83. See generally, JOHN CARSWELL, THE SOUTH SEA
BU3BLE (Sutton Pub. 2002).
64. The South Sea Company had assumed 31,000,000 pounds of debt which was to be
exchanged at market prices for South Sea Company stock at market prices. The Bubble
Act was passed on 11 June 1720, South Sea Company shares peaked on 24 June 1720, and
the crash occurred in September of 1720. COOKE, supra note 2, at 82-83. Many earlier
authors, however, viewed the Bubble Act as a reaction to the stock boom itself. See, e.g.,
H. A. Shannon, The Coming of General Limited Liability, 2 Econ. Hist. 267, 268 (1931).
65. "An act for better securing certain powers and privileges intended to be granted
by his Majesty by two charters for assurance of ships and merchandizes at sea, and for
lending money upon bottomry; and for restraining several extravagant and unwarrantable
practices therein mentioned," 6 Geo. I, c. 18 (1719).
66. Id. at I.-XVII.
67. Id. at XVIII.-XXIX.
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esting due to certain provisions contained within the charters. The second
is important because it essentially cut off the growth of the private corpo-
ration in England until the nineteenth century.
The two charters contained provisions establishing their important inci-
dents: (1) a "distinct and separate body politick"; (2) perpetual succes-
sion; (3) the right to choose their respective directors, etc.; (4) a common
seal; (5) rights to purchase and sell; and (6) to sue and be sued. 68 From
this, despite the prevalence of Coke's influence, it seems that corpora-
tions still felt it best to include all their incidents within the charter,
whether automatic or not. The charter detailed the capital of the corpora-
tion 69 and established that each shareholder would share in any profits
only according to his proportional share thereof.70 More interestingly, the
charters established that as to any liabilities, court decisions, etc., each
shareholder was only liable for his proportional share of such liabilities
and established penalties (essentially forfeit of shares) necessary to en-
force such payments.7' Further, all shares in the corporations were freely
transferable. 72 Finally, among other incidents, the corporations were
given power to establish their own by-laws and ordinances. 73 While these
companies were only created through charters and not pursuant to any
general view of corporate powers and attributes, the companies thereby
established were very similar to the attributes generally attributed to
modern corporations, i.e., perpetuity of existence, limited liability of
shareholders, central direction through a board of directors, and free
transferability of shares. 74 The conclusion then is that even as early as
1719, essentially modern corporate structures could be created, though
the incidents were still only by contract and not automatically by estab-
lished law.
The second section of the Bubble Act of 1720 essentially halted further
progress of the development of the private business corporation in
England:
68. Id. at I.
69. Id. at I1.-V.
70. Each person is entitled to "a proportional share of the profits and advantages at-
tending the capital stock of such corporation respectively... ; but that no person or persons
shall be entitled to any greater share in the capital or nominal stock of either of such
respective corporations, than the money which he, she or they shall have paid towards the
same." Id. at VI.
71. Id. at VII. At this time, shareholders often did not pay their entire subscription in
advance but rather were liable for calls on such sums as necessary; however, under these
charters shareholders were only liable up to the maximum of their share of callable capital.
In other words, while shareholders were liable beyond their initial payment, they were not
liable beyond their maximum allotted subscription.
72. Id. at IX.
73. Id. at XI. This is especially indicative of the advanced nature of the private busi-
ness corporation in England at this time. Later commentators have suggested that in the
United States shares were not freely transferable at all until the late nineteenth century.
See generally Conard, supra note 22.
74. See generally, Gower, supra note 2, and COOKE, supra note 2, for a discussion of
the modern attributes of the corporate form.
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That from and after the four and twentieth day of June one thousand
seven hundred and twenty, all and every the undertakings and at-
tempts described, as aforesaid, and all other publick undertakings
and attempts, tending to the common grievance, prejudice and in-
convenience of his Majesty's subjects, or great numbers of them, in
their trade, commerce, or other lawful affairs, and all publick sub-
scriptions, receipts, payments, assignments, transfers, pretended as-
signments and transfers, and all other matters and things whatsoever,
for furthering, countenancing or proceeding in any such undertaking
or attempt, and more particularly the acting or presuming to act as a
corporate body or bodies, the raising or pretending to raise transfer-
rable stock or stocks, the transferring or pretending to transfer or
assign any share or shares in such stock or stocks, without legal au-
thority, either by an act of parliament, or by any charter from the
crown, for particular or special purposes therein expressed, by per-
sons who do or shall use or endeavour to use the same charters, for
raising a capital stock, or for making transfers or assignments, or pre-
tended transfers or assignments of such stock, not intended or de-
fined by such charter to be raised or transferred, and all acting or
pretending to act under any obsolete charter become void or voida-
ble by nonuser or abuser, or for want of making lawful elections,
which were necessary to continue the corporations thereby intended,
shall ... for ever be deemed to be illegal and void, and shall not be
practiced or in any wise put in execution. 75
In short, the private business company (termed the "joint stock com-
pany" in English practice) as it was developing up to that time in England
was effectively terminated. No new joint stock companies could be
formed, although previous charters continued in existence. Interestingly,
the provisions of the Act were written in such a way as not to effect any
of the existing regulated companies, including the South Sea Company-
generally agreed to have been the major culprit in the events resulting in
the often incorrectly viewed necessity of enacting the Bubble Act itself.7 6
By its provisions, the Act did not apply to partnerships, but to some ex-
tent this provision makes the act more unclear and therefore more de-
structive to business than it was by its own terms.77 Overall, the Act,
75. 6 Geo. I, c. 18 at XVIII.
76. See generally, CARSWELL, supra note 63. Cooke, however, suggests a different and
perhaps more accurate view of the situation. Essentially, one of the functions of the South
Sea Company had been to assume the entirety of the government debt and sell off shares
to finance that debt. With such a situation in mind, so long as the stock of the South Sea
Company continued to climb, the government debt could continue to be increased; unfor-
tunately, other joint stock companies were coming into existence and absorbing large
amounts of the capital that the government would have preferred to go into increasing the
debt. To that end, Parliament passed the Bubble Act to prevent the creation of new corpo-
rations that might diminish the value of South Sea Company stock. As evidence of his
point, Cooke suggests that in fact the price of South Sea Company shares hit its highest
mark after the passage of the Bubble Act and that prices did not come down until the true
extent of the widespread corruption involved came to the surface. See COOKE, supra note
2, at 80-83.
77. "That nothing in this act shall extend, or be construed to extend to prohibit or
restrain the carrying on of any home or foreign trade in partnership in such manner as hath
been hitherto usually, and may be legally done according to the laws of this realm now in
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while retarding the development of the corporate form, probably did not
retard overall business development although it did force most such busi-
nesses to be created under contract (typically based on partnership struc-
tures) rather than under general provisions of corporate law. 78
1. Blackstone's Commentaries
In chapter eighteen of his Commentaries, Blackstone addressed the
general law of corporations. 79 Blackstone first spoke of the usefulness of
the corporation:
[I]t has been found necessary, when it is for the advantage of the
public to have any particular rights kept on foot and continued, to
constitute artificial persons, who may maintain a perpetual succes-
sion, and enjoy a kind of legal immortality.80
[AccordinglyJ [t]hese artificial persons are called bodies politic, bod-
ies corporate, or corporations ... 81
Blackstone divided corporations first into aggregate and sole. 82 "Cor-
porations aggregate consist of many persons united together into one so-
ciety, and are kept up by a perpetual succession of members, so as to
continue for ever .... ",83 Corporations sole consisted of only one person
and his successors in some particular station who for certain reasons re-
quired the advantages of perpetuity.84 Corporations were further divided
into ecclesiastical and lay. Ecclesiastical corporations were made up en-
tirely of religious persons, and have not existed at all in the United States
without formal incorporation. 85 Lay corporations were then divided into
civil and eleemosynary, with the eleemonsynary sort "constituted for the
perpetual distribution of the free alms, or bounty, of the founder of them
to such persons as he has directed. '8 6
Blackstone stated that "in England, the king's consent is absolutely
necessary to the erection of any corporation, either impliedly or expressly
force." Id. at XXV. In fact, in the eighteenth century there was only one case under the
act, although the defendant was in fact found guilty of "setting up a bubble called the
North Sea." R. v. Cawood, 2 Ld. Raymond 1361 (1724). The Act was revived briefly in the
early nineteenth century, but in 1825, the Attorney-General declared that "it appears to be
agreed on all hands that [the Act's] meaning and effect are altogether unintelligible."
Shannon, supra note 64, at 270 (citing 13 Hansard 1019 (1825)). The Act was officially
repealed in 1825. 6 Geo. IV, c. 91 (1825).
78. COOKE, supra note 2, at 85-88. Many commentators suggest that while the Act
was not really enforced, its prohibitions were both so potentially disastrous and so abso-
lutely incomprehensible that it forced businesses to develop less efficient forms than other-
wise might have been the case. See id. See also, Shannon, The Coming of General Limited
Liability, supra note 64, at 270: "[l]n creating a greater reluctance to grant charters of
incorporations, the Act had its greatest influence against the joint-stock form."
79. I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *467.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 469.
83. Id.
84. These corporations are rare in this country but examples include Roman Catholic
Bishops, who are generally incorporated as corporations sole.
85. 1 BLACKSI ONE, supra note 79, at *470.
86. Id. at *470-71.
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given. The king's implied consent is to be found in corporations which
exist by force of the common law, to which our former kings are sup-
posed to have given their concurrence. '8 7 Consent was also assumed in
cases of prescription in cases where corporations had existed as corpora-
tions since "time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the con-
trary; and therefore are looked upon in law to be well created. '8
Consent was expressly given by either (1) an act of parliament or (2) a
charter granted by the king.89
Blackstone listed five necessary incidents to the creation of any corpo-
ration: (1) to have perpetual succession; (2) to sue and be sued, implead
or be impleaded, grant or to receive, by its corporate name, and do all
other acts as a natural person; (3) to purchase and hold lands; (4) to have
a common seal; and (5) to make by-laws or private statutes.90 Here,
Blackstone essentially does nothing more than reprise Coke in Sutton's
Hospital. As to privileges and disabilities, Blackstone also followed
Coke's theory of the corporation:
It must always appear by attorney; for it cannot appear in person,
being, as sir Edward Coke says, invisible, and existing only in intend-
ment and consideration of law. It can neither maintain, or be made
defendant to, an action of battery or such like personal injuries: for a
corporation can neither beat nor be beaten, in its body politic. A
corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime, in its
corporate capacity: though its members may, in their distinct individ-
ual capacities. Neither is it capable of suffering a traitor's or felon's
punishment, for it is not liable to corporal penalties, nor to attainder,
forfeiture, or corruption of blood.91
Likewise following Coke, Blackstone stated that corporations are em-
powered only to the extent of their charters. Namely, "[t]he general du-
ties of all bodies politic, considered in their corporate capacity, may, like
those of natural persons, be reduced to this single one; that of acting up
to the end or design, whatever it be, for which they were created by their
founder. ' 92 Unlike previous writers, Blackstone made clear what he
meant by the right of visitation. Essentially, visitation by the sovereign
meant that corporations are amenable to suit in the King's courts for
their actions, etc.93
As for the real effect of visitation, one must look to Blackstone's dis-
cussion of the dissolution of corporations-an area seemingly not previ-
ously addressed in any coherent form. According to Blackstone, a
corporation could be dissolved in four ways: (1) by act of parliament; (2)
by the natural death of all its members, in case of an aggregate corpora-
tion; (3) by forfeiture of its charter, through negligence or abuse of its
87. Id. at *472.
88. Id. at *473.
89. Id.
90. Id. at *475.
91. Id. at *476-77.
92. Id. at *480.
93. Id. at *481.
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franchises; and (4) by surrender of its franchises into the hands of the
king. 94 The third of these mechanisms is striking because it suggests that
if the corporation breached the contract made by its charter, then the
incorporation was void and the corporation ceased to exist. Forfeiture of
a corporate charter through abuse of franchise also would appear to give
teeth to the power of visitation: after all, if the sovereign could visit the
corporation, discover it had abused its mandate, and subsequently revoke
the corporate charter, then such a situation would indicate a real power
of sovereign regulation over corporate power.
2. Adam Smith and The Wealth of Nations
Adam Smith addressed corporations in his famous work, The Wealth of
Nations, published in 1776.95 Although The Wealth of Nations is not a
legal treatise, it is nonetheless illustrative of the contemporary view of
corporations, and further detailed the views of one of the foremost eco-
nomic thinkers on the subject-an economic thinker who was in fact
trained as a lawyer. Overall, Smith was not fond of the idea of large com-
panies: "These companies, though they may, perhaps, have been useful
for the first introduction of some branches of commerce, by making, at
their own expense, an experiment which the State might not think it pru-
dent to make, have in the long run proved, universally, either burden-
some or useless, and have either mismanaged or combined trade. '96
Interestingly, despite Smith's significant abilities in other areas of eco-
nomics, he missed the future importance of the corporate form (although
he did foreshadow its early development in America). 97
Smith began by dividing companies into two types: (1) regulated com-
panies and (2) joint stock companies. 98 Regulated companies were
"obliged to admit any person, properly qualified, upon paying a certain
fine, and agreeing to submit to the regulations of the company, each
member trading upon his own stock, and at his own risk."99 Such corpora-
tions resembled the guilds then existing throughout Europe, which gener-
ally had some sort of a monopoly over trade, regulated through the
devices of fines and apprenticeship. 0 0 Altogether, Smith had little use for
this sort of a monopoly.' 0 ' Smith cited as another example of the regu-
94. Id. at *485.
95. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (1776), reprinted in 18 A Library of Universal Literature (1901).
96. Id. at 100.
97. See COOKE, supra note 2, at 91. "The accuracy of Adam Smith's observations is
confirmed from American Experience, for the prominent joint stock companies of the
United States in the first thirty years of independence were banks, stage companies, turn-
pike companies, canal companies, water companies and insurance companies." Id. (citing
JOSEPH S. DAVIS, 2 ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 297
(1917)).
98. SMrrIH, supra note 95, at 100-01.
99. Id. at 100.
100. Id. at 101.
101. Smith was against the granting of monopolies in any form:
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lated company, the "regulated companies for foreign commerce.' 10 2
These companies were given a monopoly in a certain trade, and Smith
was no less critical of this type: "[T]hough such companies may not, in the
present times, be very oppressive, they are certainly altogether useless. To
be merely useless, indeed, is perhaps the highest eulogy which can ever
justly be bestowed upon a regulated company. ' 10 3 Further, according to
Smith, the object of all regulated companies as put forth through their by-
laws was "not so much to oppress those who are already members, as to
discourage others from becoming so. ' '104 As to these state established
monopolies, history agrees with Smith that they are not good for com-
merce; however, Smith was almost equally opposed to the joint stock
company form itself, even without monopoly powers.
Joint stock companies were established either by royal charter or by act
of Parliament. 10 5 Smith here moved beyond earlier authors in that he in
fact attributed somewhat different attributes to different types of compa-
nies and actually differentiated between various private companies and
municipal corporations. 10 6 Smith listed two principal differences between
partnerships 10 7 and joint stock companies. First, "in a private copartnery,
no partner, without the consent of the company, can transfer his share to
another person, or introduce a new member in to the company."' 08 In a
joint stock company, the shares were freely transferable: "In a joint stock
company... no member can demand payment of his share from the com-
pany, but each member can, without their consent, transfer his share to
another person, and thereby introduce a new member."' 0 9 Further, the
values of such shares were to be determined by the market rather than
the shareholder's actual share of the company. 110 The second difference
according to Smith was that "in a private copartnery, each partner is
bound for the debts contracted by the company to the whole extent of his
fortune. In a joint stock company, on the contrary, each partner is bound
only to the extent of his share." '' Smith thus described the essential
When they have been allowed to act according to their natural genius, they
have always, in order to confine the competition to as small a number of
persons as possible, endeavored to subject the trade to many burdensome
regulations. When the law has restrained them from doing this, they have
become altogether useless and insignificant.
Id.
102. Id. He cites as examples the Hamburg Company, the Russia Company, the East-
land Company, the Turkey Company, and the African Company. Id. at 102.
103. Id. at 103.
104. Id. at 104.
105. Id. at 111.
106. Smith terms municipal corporations as "corporations," thereby differentiating
them from "companies," and discusses them elsewhere in his work. Id.
107. Smith terms these "private copartneries." Id.
108. Id. Interestingly, "[e]ach member ... may, upon proper warning, withdraw from




111. Id. The exact meaning is somewhat unclear; however, generally at this time, share-
holders agreed to be responsible for a certain amount of total capital even though gener-
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modern difference between partnerships and corporations: (1) free trans-
ferability and (2) limited liability."12
Smith next described how joint stock companies are "always managed
by a court of directors," which is "frequently subject, in many respects, to
the control of a general court of proprietors." 113 Here, Smith described
the modern governmental structure of a corporation: a board of directors
responsible in general to the shareholders. Unfortunately, this aspect was
and continues to be a central problem with the form of the joint stock
company: the conflict created by the separation of ownership and con-
trol. 11 4 According to Smith:
the greater part of these proprietors seldom pretend to understand
anything of the business of the company; and when the spirit of fac-
tion happens not to prevail among them, give themselves no trouble
about it, but receive contentedly such half-yearly or yearly dividend,
as the directors think proper to make to them." 15
Such "total exemption from trouble and from risk, beyond a limited
sum, encourages many people to become adventurers in joint stock com-
panies, who would, upon no account, hazard their fortunes in any private
copartnery."" 6 Smith did admit that because of this "exemption from
trouble and from risk," joint stock companies were able to raise signifi-
cantly more capital than almost any private copartnery. 17 While this may
indicate that these ventures were seen in terms of gambling, many small
merchants and other persons with excess, although not necessarily signifi-
cant, capital could thereby take part in potentially profitable adventures.
Further, given that paid in capital was generally not equivalent to total
capital, many would buy in for relatively small amounts, although with
potentially greater liability-in many ways perhaps not too dissimilar
from buying stock on margin today.
Given this description, Smith raised a very valid economic objection to
this form of business:
The directors of such companies . . . being the managers rather of
other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with
which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over
their own . . . . Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always
prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a
company. "18
ally they did not pay it all in at any given time. The result, then, is functional limited
liability even though the shareholder could potentially be liable beyond the amount of his
actual investment, but only up to the maximum amount he was responsible for.
112. See COOKE, supra note 2, at 18. Cooke, in fact, based his entire analysis of the
development of the modern English corporation upon the analysis of these two factors.
113. SMITH, supra note 95, at 111. For a description of the operation of this structure in
the context of the English East India Company, see Keay, supra note 27, at 25-29.
114. See generally, BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3.
115. SMrrH, supra note 95, at 111-12.
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Smith stated this as the reason why joint stock companies for foreign
trade had seldom been able to compete with private adventurers, at least
without a monopoly, and given a monopoly, these companies had "both
mismanaged and confined" trade. 119 Overall, Smith presented the eco-
nomic basis for the well-developed law of fiduciary duty in the context of
corporation in the U.S. 120 The only cases where such companies have suc-
ceeded, according to Smith, were those in which such companies were
composed of a small number of proprietors, with a moderate capital-
cases when the form approached that of a private "copartnery.' 12'
Smith went on to suggest that sometimes a joint stock company may in
fact serve the best interests of the state:
When a company of merchants undertake, at their own risk and ex-
pense, to establish a new trade with some remote and barbarous na-
tion, it may not be unreasonable to incorporate them into a joint
stock company, and to grant them, in case of their success, a monop-
oly of the trade for a certain number of years. 122
Smith compared such a situation to a patent or copyright and suggested
that the public benefits of such a temporary situation outweigh the usual
costs, so long as the monopoly was only temporary. 123
Accepting the conclusion that joint stock companies may sometimes be
of use, Smith described the situations in which they might be successfully
and advantageously incorporated without being granted monopoly
privileges:
The only trades which it seems possible for a joint stock company to
carry on successfully, without an exclusive privilege, are those of
which all the operations are capable of being reduced to what is
called a routine, or to such a uniformity of method as admits of little
or no variation. 24
Assuming this predicate, Smith listed four such situations: (1) banking;
(2) insurance; (3) the making of canals; and (4) the bringing of water to a
city.' 25 Interestingly, these are the principal types of early corporation
established in the United States.126 Given these four types, Smith then
explained how in his view these businesses may be reduced to the terms
he requires for the success of a joint stock company. Along with the gen-
eral reduction to routine within the operations of the business, Smith re-
119. Id. Smith cites as the prime example of this theory, the previously described expe-
rience of the South Sea Company in the early 1700s-by his terms, a company with "an
immense capital divided among an immense number of proprietors." Id. at 116.
120. For a review of the subsequent development of the laws of shareholder rights and
corporate responsibilities, see CONARD, supra note 22.
121. SMITH, supra note 95, at 115.
122. Id. at 129.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 131. Smith means that the only successful joint stock companies will be
those which rely on economies of scale and scope as to capital, rather than those depending
more on the abilities of the management. As already seen, Smith viewed the management
of the joint stock company as its greatest liability.
125. Id. at 131.
126. See generally, DAvis, supra note 97.
2002]
SMU LAW REVIEW
quired two additional circumstances: "First, it ought to appear with the
clearest evidence, that the undertaking is of greater and more general
utility than the greater part of common trades; and secondly, that it re-
quires a greater capital than can easily be collected into a private
copartnery."' 27 These are in fact the two general benefits on which most
theorists base the success of the early business corporation in America:
(1) general public utility and (2) the need for greater aggregate capital
than typically available. 2 8 Overall, however, outside of these areas,
Smith concluded that the joint stock company in general is made unman-
ageable by the centralized control of the directors:
The joint stock companies which are established for the public-spir-
ited purpose of promoting some particular manufacture, over and
above managing their own affairs ill, to the diminution of the general
stock of the society, can in other respects scarce even fail to do more
harm than good. Notwithstanding the most upright intentions, the
unavoidable partiality of their directors to particular branches of the
manufacture, of which the undertakers mislead and impose upon
them, is a real discouragement to the rest, and necessarily breaks,
more or less, that natural proportion which would otherwise estab-
lish itself between judicious industry and profit, and which, to the
general industry of the country, is of all encouragements the greatest
and most effectual. 129
3. Kyd's A Treatise on the Law of Corporations
Angell and Ames suggested that Stewart Kyd wrote the first English
language treatise solely on the subject of corporations in 1793;130 how-
ever, as already discussed this was in fact not the case. Overall, Kyd ad-
ded little in the way of development of the corporation, especially since
his work focused almost exclusively on municipal corporations. Instead,
he really only suggests the continued continuity of the form with Coke's
earlier formulations.
Kyd defined a corporation as:
A corporation, or body politic, or body incorporate is a collection of
many individuals united in one body, under a special denomination,
having perpetual succession under an artificial form, and vested by
the policy of law, with a capacity of acting, in several respects, as an
individual, particularly of taking and granting property, contracting
obligations, and of suing and being sued; of enjoying privileges and
immunities in common, and of exercising a variety of political rights,
more or less extensive, according to the design of its institution, or
the powers conferred upon it, either at the time of its creation, or at
any subsequent period of its existence. 131
127. SMITH, supra note 95, at 133.
128. See generally, Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business
Corporations, ch. 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1945).
129. SMITH, supra note 95, at 134-35.
130. Stewart Kyd, A Treatise on the Law of Corporations (1793).
131. 1 Kyd at 12.
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Kyd then listed five necessary incidents to any proper incorporation:
(1) perpetual succession; (2) to sue and be sued, implead and be im-
pleaded, grant and receive, and do all other acts as a natural person; (3)
to purchase and hold lands; (4) to have a common seal; and (5) to make
by-laws.1 32 While these are the necessary incidents, Kyd required only
three requirements to form what he called "the complete idea of the cor-
poration aggregate": (1) to have perpetual succession under a special de-
nomination and under an artificial form; (2) to be able to take and grant
property, to contract obligations, and to sue and be sued by its corporate
name, in the same manner as an individual; and (3) to receive grants of
privileges and immunities from the state and for members to enjoy them
in common.133
II. AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT TO THE DARTMOUTH
COLLEGE CASE
Early development in the U.S. was the result of development in En-
gland up to approximately 1776.134 In 1741 the Bubble Act of 1720 was
officially extended to apply to the colonies as a result of the operations of
the Land-bank of Massachusetts.1 35 Admittedly, as in England, the un-
predictability of this Act probably slowed down the development of the
corporation in the United States until the time of the Revolution, al-
though in this early period the absence of necessary concentrations of
individuals with capital to invest probably slowed development more than
any other factor. 136 Further, in the U.S., as in England, businesses were
formed according to private articles of agreement, so that even though
actually partnerships, these businesses approximated the joint stock
form.137 According to Williston, in 1768 Pennsylvania chartered the first
American business corporation and the only business corporation whose
charter predated the Declaration of Independence, The Philadelphia
132. Id. at 69.
133. Id. at 70.
134. According to Bowman, three factors are most significant in explaining "the virtual
absence of English law pertaining to the business corporation at the time of American
independence": (1) industrial and trading monopolies of the fifteenth and sixteenth centu-
ries were mostly quasi-public corporations; and (2) the Bubble Act; and (3) British lawyers
and jurists declined the opportunity when presented. BOWMAN, supra note 2, at 40 (citing
DUBOIS, supra note 2, at 86).
135. Simeon E. Baldwin, History of the Law of Private Corporations in the Colonies and
States, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 236, 246 (1909). The
"Manufacturing Company" or Land-bank of Massachusetts apparently circulated its own
bills (i.e. currency) in the amount of nearly 50,000 pounds sterling against the protest of the
royal Governor. The Land-bank was purported to have been incorporated in Massachu-
setts, but Baldwin found no evidence that such incorporation in fact occurred. Id. at 244
n.1.
136. Handlin & Handlin, supra note 128, at 5; Baldwin, supra note 135, at 246.
137. Shaw Livermore, Unlimited Liability in Early American Corporations, 43 J. OF
POL. ECON. 674, 674 n.2 (1935). Such partnerships were numerous in England by 1760 and
also began to appear in America around this time. Id.
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Contributionship for Insuring Houses from Loss by Fire. 38
A. GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION
Most commentators agree that the Revolution in the United States and
the subsequent adoption of the Constitution in 1789 provided the basis
for the rapid development of the private business corporation in the
United States.139 While the Bubble Act was not officially repealed at that
time, with independence it ceased to restrain corporate development in
the United States. 40
As empirical evidence of this proposition, the United States produced
almost 350 corporations between 1783 and 1801, and by 1789 Massachu-
setts even had an early general incorporation law for aqueduct corpora-
tions.141 By 1787, five more joint stock business corporations were
chartered in America in addition to the fire insurance company first
chartered in Pennsylvania: "The Bank of North America," chartered by
Congress in 1781, and by Pennsylvania in 1787; "The Massachusetts
Bank," in 1784; "The Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge," in 1785;
"The Mutual Assurance Co." (Philadelphia), in 1786; and "The Associ-
ated Manufacturing Iron Co." (New York), in 1786.142 Despite Smith's
theories of corporate irresponsibility, 43 corporations began increasingly
to compete with older structures in manufacturing and other previously
unincorporated forms of business.' 44 Interestingly, these developments
were centered almost entirely in New England, with only fifteen percent
of the total being created in New York and Pennsylvania. 45
The question arises then as to why this sudden development of corpo-
rations in the United States occurred during this period.' 46 Simeon Bald-
win in a study of the American business corporation before 1789
suggested two essential reasons to use 1789 to mark the beginning of the
original period of corporate development in the United States: (1) events
in France and (2) events in the United States. 47 In France, the States
General was convened and began to pull down the ancient French forms
of central authority. 48 In the United States, the First Congress began
work on creating a government based on a narrowly defined central gov-
138. Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2
HARV. L. REv. 149, 165 (1888).
139. See, e.g., HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note 128, at 2..
140. See id. at 5.
141. Id. at 4 n.20.
142. Id.
143. See discussion supra, Part I.B.2.
144. HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note 128, at 6.
145. Id. at 7. By 1830, the chartered capital of banks and insurance companies in Mas-
sachusetts alone amounted to about $30,000,000, with various manufacturing companies
holding even more. Art Vl-Corporations, 4 Am. JuRsT & L. MAG. 298, 300 (1830).
146. See, e.g., Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation,
50 WM. & MARY Q. 51 (1993).
147. Simeon E. Baldwin, American Business Corporations Before 1789, in I ANN. REP.
OF THE AM. HisT. ASS'N, or the year 1902, 255 (1903).
148. Id. at 255.
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ernment, strong within its purview, combined with a system of strong lo-
cal governments. 149 According to Baldwin, until the strong and secure
central government was established by the Constitution, thereby signaling
final freedom from the restraints then existing in England, corporations
established by the state could not begin to multiply effectively. As evi-
dence of the importance of this event, Baldwin details the creation of
only six distinctly American corporations before 1776.150
Most commentators noted three attributes of the American business
corporation by 1789: (1) fictitious personality and centralized manage-
ment; (2) limited liability of shareholders for debts of the corporation;
and (3) freedom from government interference through the mechanism
of the perpetual charter. 151 The Handlins, however, demonstrated that
these attributes were not in fact in place by this time, but rather that
corporate development nonetheless accelerated during this period. First,
Handlin and Handlin suggest that structurally the corporate form had few
advantages over other business forms.152 Second, they suggest that the
existence of limited liability may explain the acceleration of the use of the
corporate form in the United States during this period but quickly dis-
count that as the dispositive factor since so few corporations requested
that privilege during this period. 153 Further, the Handlins suggest that the
idea of limited liability is not even really suggested in the law at this time,
despite the historical view of the corporate common purse. 154 In light of
this state of affairs, the Handlins suggest that limited liability was not
149. Id. at 255-56.
150. Id. at 257. The six pre-1776 corporations were: (1) "The New York Company 'for
Settling a Fishery in these parts"' (1675); (2) "The Free Society of Traders," in Penn-
sylvania (1682); (3) "The New London Society United for Trade and Commerce in Con-
necticut" (1732); (4) "The Union Wharf Company in New Haven" (1760); (5) "The
Philadelphia Contributionship for the Insuring of Houses from Loss by Fire" (1768); and
(6) "The Proprietors of Boston Pier, or the Long Wharf, in the Town of Boston in New
England" (1772). Id.
151. Handlin & Handlin, supra note 128, at 2.
152. Id. at 8.
153. Id. at 8-9. At this time, limited liability of shareholders for corporate debts was
only available if requested as a privilege to be granted in the charter by the incorporating
state. See Livermore, supra note 137. According to Livermore, during this period, various
states in fact imposed general liability on corporations, only to repeal these provisions
later. Massachusetts imposed general liability in 1808, then repealed the statute in 1829.
Maine rejected unlimited liability in 1823, soon after its establishment. Throughout this
period, Connecticut dealt with the matter solely through the charters themselves. Interest-
ingly, New York's 1811 general incorporation act, New York Statutes, VII, 233, imposed
general liability although this was not widely recognized. Id. at 677-87. Overall, limited
liability in the United States was certainly not clear until at least 1832.
154. Under the doctrine of the common purse, a corporation or joint stock company's
debts were first charged against the common purse; however, the exhaustion of the com-
mon purse did not mean that the shareholders were no longer liable. Handlin & Handlin,
supra note 128, at 10. The authors suggest that Lord Kenyon's decision in Russell v. Men
of Devon, 2 T.R. 672 (1788), reprinted in 29 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (K.B. 19009), which is often
cited as upholding limited liability in fact only held that the absence of a corporate fund
was evidence that an English county was in fact not a corporation. Id. at 10 n.51. Angell
and Ames later suggested that in fact the existence of a common purse was the differentiat-




really an issue because at this time corporations still used assessments
against individual shareholders for funds, rather than a full payout at the
start up of the enterprise. 55 Shareholders thus continued to be liable for
additional assessments to cover corporate needs.1 56 Finally, the Handlins
assert that freedom from state interference through the mechanism of the
charter as contract did not become in any way settled until the Dartmouth
College decision. 157
Accordingly, the development of the American business corporation
during this period was not necessarily a result of the attributes of eco-
nomic efficiency, limited liability, or freedom from state interference.1 58
Rather, the Handlins assert that corporations developed in the United
States during the last two decades of the eighteenth century as a result of
their essentially democratic character. In other words, corporations were
conceived as "an agency of government, endowed with public attributes,
exclusive privileges, and political power, and designed to serve a social
function for the state."' 59 For this reason, early corporations were prima-
rily semi-public institutions such as turnpikes and banks, rather than capi-
talistic ventures such as trade and land speculation.1 60 Corporations, then,
spread benefits across society and transformed the corporate institution
from a mechanism designed to protect privileges, as in Europe, to one of
essentially democratic character designed to allow development of public
enterprises that otherwise could not have taken place, especially since
significant accumulations of wealth necessary for large scale projects did
not exist in the early nineteenth century. 61 The extension of corporate
status, sovereign power, and economic privilege by the state allowed pri-
vate associations of individuals to accomplish projects beyond their indi-
vidual means, thus satisfying both economic necessity and republican
ideology. 162
155. Handlin & Handlin, supra note 128, at 13.
156. Id. at 14-16 (citing various statutes and charters imposing general liability upon
members of corporations).
157. See discussion infra Part ll.B.
158. Handlin & Handlin, supra note 128, at 22.
159. Id. Tocqueville also felt that the corporation fit the American cultural scene in
that it was an ideal instrument by which a republican government could perform its obliga-
tions to enterprising citizens. See ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 342
(J.P. Mayer & Maxlenney eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Rou 1966) (1817).
160. Handlin & Handlin, supra note 128, at 22.
161. Id. at 23. For a general discussion of the problem, see G.S. Callender, The Early
Transportation and Banking Enterprises of the States in Relation to the Growth of Corpora-
tions, 17 Q.J. ECON. 111 (1902).
162. R. Kent Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story's Doctrine of 'Public and Private Corpora-
tions' and the Rise of the American Business Corporation, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 825, 826
(1976) (citing EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MASSACHUSETTS 11 (1954)). According to Dodd: "[B]y
1830 the New England states alone had created nearly 1,900 business corporations, includ-
ing nearly 600 manufacturing and mining companies in addition to public utilities, banks,
insurance companies, and a few business enterprises of other types." Id.
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B. ANTI-CORPORATE ARGUMENTS
A notable feature of this important developmental period was the gen-
eral debate regarding the corporate form itself.163 Although this early dis-
agreement in America centered on municipal corporations, the views
expressed were later used in debates regarding the private business cor-
poration.164 Arguments against corporations were generally based on the
assertion that they were by nature undemocratic and symbols of the order
that had been rejected in the Revolution. 165 Other principled arguments
focused on the idea that "corporations violated the sovereignty of the
people by granting privileges to a limited number of persons separated
from the rest of the population. ' 166
Conversely, corporate proponents did not necessarily differ about the
history of corporations or about the origin of such privileges.167 Propo-
nents, however, drew different conclusions about the present need for
corporations in America. Basically, they argued that because corpora-
tions allowed groups to conduct business through the mechanism of self-
rule and elected representatives, corporations were essentially demo-
cratic institutions. 168 As such, corporations reflected the best expression
of American democracy in a business context. By 1789, while the debate
continued as to the nature and need for private corporations, municipal
corporations had established their place in America if by nothing else
than by the volume of municipal charters that were requested, granted,
and used. 169
Arguments against the emerging business corporation largely followed
the pattern established in the debate over municipal corporations 170 and
continued well into the nineteenth century. 171 In the case of business cor-
porations, criticisms were especially strong against corporations in that
they have little public benefit. 72 Further, anti-monopoly proponents who
followed Smith argued strongly against the creation of any sort of monop-
olistic corporate business venture. 173 Business corporations, even without
monopoly powers, were charged with contributing to an improper distri-
bution of wealth. 174 After all, since corporations had the potential for
perpetual succession, property could be tied up indefinitely and thereby
never transferred according to policies of distribution of wealth as evi-
163. See Maier, supra note 146, at 60. Newmyer agrees: "Despite the congeniality be-
tween the corporation and government, there was a large area of conflict and tension
between the two during the formative period of corporate development." Newmyer, supra
note 162, at 826.
164. Maier, supra note 146, at 58-60.
165. Id. at 61.
166. Id. at 62.
167. Id.
168. Id. See TOQUEVILLE, supra note 159.
169. Maier, supra note 146, at 63-64.
170. Id. at 65.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 66.
173. Id. at 67-68.
174. Id. at 69.
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denced by American laws of distribution, succession, and taxation. 175 As
corporations continued to multiply, the argument based on the charges of
accumulated corporate property became stronger,176 especially after the
Dartmouth College decision. 177 In fact, estimates suggested that corpora-
tions owned perhaps one-fifth of all property in Massachusetts by 1827.178
Corporations were accused of corruption as well, following the attempts
of the Second Bank of the United States to have its charter renewed.' 79
Finally, Smith's arguments of corporate inefficiency as a method of eco-
nomic development were often voiced during this time.180
C. THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE
Justice Joseph Story has been credited with the transformation of
American corporate law into the modern business organization that it has
become today.181 To a large extent, Justice Story's decision in Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward'82 was the basis of the later develop-
ment of corporate law in the United States.183 The decision in Dartmouth
College, however, was far from a clear resolution. In fact, in Head &
Amory v. Providence Insurance Co.,184 the Supreme Court emphasized
the public nature of the corporation and implied legislative control over it
with Chief Justice Marshall's declaration that the corporation "is the
mere creature of the act to which it owes its existence," and that "all its
powers" and the manner in which they may be used is determined by the
act of state creating its existence.185 Overall, this decision was based
largely on the doctrine philosophy that in order to exist, the corporation
had to provide some sort of public benefit; however, in respect to new
manufacturing companies, this requirement and in fact the need for such
a requirement was becoming increasingly unclear. 186 Further, in order to
encourage investment of capital in these corporate ventures, investors
had to be assured that the state in actuality did not control the fate of
their investments. 87
In Fletcher v. Peck,'88 the Court held that a legislative grant to a private
land company was a contract within the meaning of article I, section 10 of
175. Id. at 69-70.
176. Id. at 70.
177. See supra Part II.
178. Maier, supra note 146, at 70 (citing Lincoln, Mozart Association Veto, in RESOLVES
OF THE GENERAL COURT FOR 1824-1828, 474-76). Maier suggests that this figure excludes
new banking, insurance, and canal companies, so the percentage of capital held in corpora-
tions was probably even higher. Id.
179. Id. at 72-73.
180. Id. at 72.
181. See Newmyer, supra note 162.
182. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
183. See Newmyer, supra note 162.
184. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127 (1804).
185. Id. at 167.
186. See Newmyer, supra note 162, at 827.
187. Id.
188. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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the Constitution;189 however, Dartmouth College extended this to hold
that a corporation's state charter also a contract within the meaning of
the contract clause' 90 . Accordingly, "[liegislative charters vested property
rights in the corporation which could not be altered unless the right to do
so had been specifically reserved in the charter."'191 As a result of this
assurance of protection from state interference, capital flowed into corpo-
rations, thereby ensuring their preeminence in the United States as vehi-
cles of economic growth.192
Overall, the issue in Dartmouth College centered on whether the New
Hampshire law that essentially reformulated the original college charter
was in fact repugnant to the United States Constitution and more specifi-
cally, whether a corporate charter was a contract within the meaning of
the contract clause. At the beginning of the 1819 term, the court held
that the corporate charter was a contract; Chief Justice Marshall deliv-
ered the majority opinion, Justices Washington and Story concurred sepa-
rately, and Justice Duvall registered a silent dissent. 93 Marshall's opinion
spent little time analyzing whether the charter was in fact a contract but
simply asserted that it was.' 94
In Dartmouth College, Chief Justice Marshall gave his definition of a
corporation:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing
only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it pos-
sesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers
upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These
are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for
which it was created. Among the most important are immortality,
and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; properties, by
which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the
same, and may act as a single individual. They enable a corporation
to manage its own affairs, and to hold property without the perplex-
ing intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity, of perpetual con-
veyance for the purpose of transmitting it hand to hand. It is chiefly
for the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these
qualities and capacities, that corporations were invented, and are in
use. By these means, a perpetual succession of individuals are capa-
ble of acting for the promotion of the particular object, like one im-
mortal being. But this being does not share in the civil government of
the country, unless that be the purpose for which it is created. Its
immortality no more confers on it political power, or a political char-
acter, than immortality would confer such power or character on a
natural person. It is no more a State instrument, than a natural per-
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Newmyer, supra note 162, at 828.
192. Id.
193. Dartmouth CoiL, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819).




son exercising the same powers would be. 195
With this opinion, Marshall, at the expense of ignoring his earlier opin-
ion in Head & Amory, secured the place of the American business corpo-
ration.196 Story, however, wanted more and therefore went on to
expound a general theory of private and public corporations that would
open the opinion to the broadest possible interpretation and significance
for the development of the corporate business form in the United
States.197 Finally, and most importantly, Story's opinion was presented as
established law by James Kent in his Commentaries on American Law,198
and taken as a starting point by Joseph Angell and Samuel Ames in their
Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate, 199 which
Newmyer identified as "the standard work on corporate law for this
period. 200
III. AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW AS OF 1832
In 1832, Jospeh K. Angell and Samuel Ames finally published the first
American treatise on the law of private corporations in the United
States.201 The Angell and Ames treatise was to proceed through eleven
editions from 1832 to 1882 and was the leading American treatise on cor-
poration law before the publication of William W. Cook's treatise in
1887.202 The authors in their Preface describe the need for the work:
195. Id. at 636.
196. Newmyer, supra note 162, at 826-27.
197. According to Newmyer, while Story's concurrence was in fact unnecessary since he
completely agreed with Marshall, the concurrence expanded upon Marshall, thereby mak-
ing clear that the opinion applied not only to eleemosynary educational institutions such as
Dartmouth College, but to all business corporations. Id. at 835-38. For this reason, the
opinion was the key in furthering the use and development of the corporate business form
in the United States. Id. Further, Story put state legislatures and the business corporation
on the same level of individual legal authority, thereby making no distinction between
mercantilism and free enterprise. Id. at 841. In other words, the corporation was not an
implement of state economic policy, but rather a free actor with contract rights equivalent
to that possessed by the state legislatures themselves. Id. Overall, this signaled the move
from European theories of mercantilism to free enterprise (laissez-faire) theories in the
United States during the early period of the republic. Id. For a general discussion of the
relation between mercantilism and laissez-faire in the early republic, Newmyer cites Rob-
ert A. Lively, The American System: A Review Article, 29 Bus. HIST. REV. 81 (1955). Id. at
841 n.60.
198. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 276 (12th ed. O.W. Holmes, Jr. 1873).
Newmyer identifies Kent's COMMENTARIES as "the most influential treatise on American
law to appear in the nineteenth century." Newmyer, supra note 162, at 838.
199. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 5.
200. Newmyer, supra note 162, at 838. See William P. Wells, The Dartmouth College
Case and Private Corporations, 9 A.B.A. Rep. 229-50 (1886), for a summary of nineteenth
century cases on the subject of Dartmouth College.
201. JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS AGGREGATE (1st ed. 1832, 2d ed. 1843, 3d ed. 1846, 4th ed. 1852, 5th ed. 1855,
6th ed. 1858, 7th ed. 1861, 8th ed. 1866, 9th ed. 1871, 10th ed. 1875, 1 Ith ed. 1882). All
citations are to the first edition of 1832.
202. WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS (1st
ed. 1887), subsequently published as A TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS AND
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW (2d ed. 1889); A TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS,
BONDS, MORTGAGES, AND GENERAL CORPORATION LAW (3d ed. 1894); and A TREATISE
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The reader does not need to be told, that we have in our country an
almost infinite number of corporations aggregate, which have no
concern whatever ... with affairs of a municipal nature. These as-
sociations we not only find scattered throughout every cultivated
part of the United States, but so engaged are they in all the varieties
of useful pursuit, that we see them directing the concentration of
mind and capital to the advancement of religion and morals; to the
diffusion of literature, science, and the arts; to the prosecution of
plans of internal communication and improvement; and to the en-
couragement and extension of the great interests of commerce, agri-
culture, and manufactures. 20 3
A. CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Angell and Ames discussed the differences between the English prac-
tice of corporations and of that in the United States: "[w]hat is done in
England by combination, unless it be the management of municipal con-
cerns, is most generally done by a combination of individuals, established
by mere articles of agreement. ' 204 In the United States, most such under-
takings were instead undertaken through an express act or charter of in-
corporation.20 5 Given this situation, Angell and Ames stated that "[w]hile
we therefore perceive the reason why so little attention has been devoted
by English authors to the law of private corporations, we cannot but be
impressed with a deep sense of the importance of this law in our own
country. °20 6 They identified (incorrectly) Kyd's work of 1753 was the first
English work devoted exclusively to corporation law,20 7 but felt it was
only useful as a general reference in the United States since despite the
author's attempt to treat corporations generally, in reality his work only
covers municipal corporations. 208 Kyd was further criticized for two prin-
ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS HAVING A CAPITAL STOCK (4th ed. 1898, 5th ed. 1903,
6th ed. 1908, 7th ed. 1913, 8th ed. 1923). According to Cook's obituary notice, his treatise
"became at once the standard work on corporation law" when first published in 1887.
Henry Winthrop Hardon, Memorial of William Wilson Cook, in N.Y. City B. Assn. Y.B.
365, 366 (1931). Cook's treatise is beyond the scope of this essay, but for an excellent
overview of his contributions, see Alfred Conard, Cook and the Corporate Shareholder: A
Belated Review of William W. Cook's Publications on Corporations, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1724
(1995).
203. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 5, at v.
204. Id. at v.
205. Id. at v-vi.
206. Id. at vi.
207. Id. But see SHEPPARD, section 1, supra Part I.A.2.
208. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 5, at vi-vii. Interestingly, the authors rely quite heav-
ily on Kyd throughout their treatise. Conard criticizes both Kyd and Angell & Ames for
their failure to treat joint stock companies, their attributes, and potential abuses ade-
quately. See CONRARD, supra note 22, at 1726-28. Conard, however, fails to note that the
corporation at the time of Angell's & Ames's first edition was still only in its early stages of
development in the United States. He therefore misses the significance of this earliest
American work in influencing the continued development of the corporate form in the
United States. After all, the position of the business corporation in the United States was
still not entirely secure even after the Dartmouth College decision, and part of the signifi-




cipal reasons: (1) corporation law at the time he wrote "had not attained
its present perfection in England;" and (2) because important changes in
such law had since been made in the United States. 20 9 With these criti-
cisms, Angell and Ames went on to rely heavily on Kyd's formulations in
their treatise on corporate law in the United States.
In their introduction, Angell and Ames defined a corporation: "A cor-
poration, as it is generally understood, is an intellectual body, created by
law, composed of individuals united under a common name, so that the
body continues the same, notwithstanding the change of the individuals
who compose it, and which for certain purposes is considered a natural
person. '"210 Taking this definition as their point of departure, Angell and
Ames stated that earlier books often confused the terms "corporation"
and "incorporation," and a reading of the earlier works suggests that this
was in fact the case.21' Further, Angell and Ames may have been the first
authors to explicitly differentiate between the two terms. Accordingly,
Angell and Ames defined "corporation" as the institution itself, while
"incorporation" as the act of creating a corporation-thus clarifying the
terms as they continue to be used.212
Angell and Ames proceeded to expound on the characteristics of the
corporation. First, they defined it as a political institution and therefore
with "no other capacities than such as are necessary to effect the purpose
of its creation. '21 3 The ultra vires doctrine by this time, therefore, seems
to have been established although Angell and Ames did not identify it as
such. Second, the corporation was immortal; however, Angell and Ames
stated that this does not mean that the corporation will continue forever,
but rather it has the capacity to operate "in perpetual succession" as long
as the corporate charter is in effect.214 Angell and Ames criticized earlier
authors for expressing the idea that a corporation was intangible, but,
they affirmed that corporations cannot be executed or imprisoned.215 Ac-
cepting the proposition that a corporation was composed of any number
of persons, but that the corporation itself was a singular entity, Angell
and Ames stated that the will of the corporation is determined by the
majority-this clearly indicates the democratic foundations of the institu-
tion at that time.216
Angell and Ames stated that a charter was required for any valid incor-
poration, and the public benefit that the corporation supplied was consid-
ered sufficient consideration for the execution of a binding and
209. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 5, at vii.
210. Id. at 1 (citing BROWNE, COMPENDIOUS VIEW OF THE CIVIL LAW 99 (1797)); LA-
CIV. CODE ANN., tit. 10, ch. 1, art. 418 (1825)). Note the similarity to Coke's much earlier
definition of corporation. See Coke, supra, Part I.A.1.
211. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 5, at 3.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 4. Angell's & Ames's term "political" merely indicates that the corporation
was a product of the state through legislative grant.
214. Id. at 4.
215. Id. at 5.
216. Id. at 6.
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irrevocable contract. 21 7 The irrevocable nature of the corporate charter
was the result of Dartmouth College, which also suggested that public
benefit was in fact one source of consideration;2 18 nonetheless, this state-
ment in Angell and Ames is important because it placed an essentially
American development in the context of the security of the corporate
form itself. Angell and Ames were convinced that a public benefit was in
fact required: "the design of a corporation is to provide for some good
that is useful to the public. 2 1 9 The need for a public benefit, however,
would seem to have been eroded by that point in time because of the
large number of purely business charters that were being granted, as well
as the evolution of general incorporation statutes in some states.
B. PRIVATE CORPORATION DEFINED
After distinguishing between the usual classes of corporations, 220 An-
gell and Ames, in Chapter I, proceeded to detail the meaning, kinds, and
history of private aggregate corporations. According to the authors, the
private corporation was distinguishable from a municipal or public corpo-
ration in that private corporations possess a corporate fund for the satis-
faction of judgments. 221 Further, due to the existence of this corporate
fund, the members had limited liability.222 With respect to municipal cor-
porations, however, "each member ... is liable in his person and private
estate to the execution. '223 While Angell and Ames did not cite any par-
ticular authority for the proposition of limited liability for the sharehold-
ers of a private aggregate corporation, they did quote Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in United States Bank v. Planters' Bank of Georgia
that seems to imply that result: "The suit is against a corporation, and the
judgment is to be satisfied by the property of the corporation, and not by
that of the individual corporators. '224 This statement seems to indicate
that the "corporators" were in fact entitled to limited liability under the
corporate form, even though Planters' Bank was a decision made in re-
217. "Persons who are disposed to make appropriations for any useful purpose, can
never fully obtain their object without an incorporating act of the government; and accord-
ingly it has been generally the policy and the custom (especially in the United States) to
incorporate all associations, which tend to the public advantage, in relation to municipal
government, commerce, literature, charity and religion.... The public benefit is deemed a
sufficient consideration of a grant of corporate privileges; and hence, when a grant of such
privileges is made (being in the nature of an executed contract), it cannot ... be revoked."
Id. at 7 (citing Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 581, 637
(1819)).
218. See Dartmouth Coll., supra Part II.
219. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 5, at 7.
220. Public and private, sole and aggregate. See ANGELL & AMES, supra note 5, at 8-
20. The authors add the remainder to the traditional types, i.e., ecclesiastical and lay, civil
and eleemosynary. Id. at 24-25.
221. Id. at 23.
222. Limited liability exists "by the irresponsibility of the members for the corporate
debts, beyond the amount of their interest in the fund..." Id.
223. Id.
224. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
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gard to the limited liability of the United States for the debts of a corpo-
ration of which the state was a shareholder.
The existence of limited liability becomes even clearer when the au-
thors compared the limited liability of a partnership to that of a corpora-
tion. According to Angell and Ames, a partnership was "a voluntary
contract between two or more persons, for joining together their money,
goods, labor, and skill, upon the mere articles of agreement, that the gain
or loss shall be divided proportionably between them; and which is not
confirmed by public authority. 2 25 The partnership, then, did not have the
political nature of a corporation through the grant of a state charter and
did not possess limited liability because the partners were proportionally
liable for all partnership debts, as proposed to a corporation, where liabil-
ity is limited to the various shares owned in a corporation. That is, in
every private unincorporated company, "the members are liable for the
debts without limitation. '2 2 6 In an incorporated company, the members
''are only liable to the extent of their shares in the stock in trade of the
society, and on contracts entered into or made in their corporate charac-
ter. ''2 27 Given that limited liability was an attribute accorded by a state
granted charter, limited liability must be seen as a significant reason for
procuring the charter in the first place.22 8 Angell and Ames therefore saw
limited liability as in fact a public benefit given to the corporation as an
annex to the public benefit the corporation must provide in order to ac-
quire a charter in the first place: "[t]he public, therefore, gain by acts
incorporating trading associations, as by such means persons are induced
to hazard a certain amount of property for the purposes of trade and
public improvement, who would abstain from so doing, were not their
liability thus limited. '2 29
In concluding their first chapter, Angell and Ames quote Kent as to the
incredible popularity of the corporate form at the time their treatise was
written:
[T]he multiplication of corporations [in the United States], and the
avidity with which they are sought, have arisen in consequence of the
power which a large and consolidated capital gives them over busi-
ness of every kind; and the facility which the incorporation gives to
the management of that capital, and the security which it affords to
the persons of the members, and to their property not vested in the
225. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 5, at 31.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. "It is frequently the object, in this and in other countries, in procuring an act of
incorporation, to limit the risk of the partners to their shares in the stock of the association;
and prudent men are always backward in taking stock when they become mere copartners
as regards their personal liability for the company debt." Id. at 23. Note also the similarity
of this section to Smith's earlier analysis. Supra, Part I.
229. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 5, at 24. This may be the closest term yet to the
modern term "limited liability." Angell and Ames mention that to some extent limited
partnerships have been used for this purpose as well. Such forms were allowed in France
as early as 1673 and later appeared in New York and Pennsylvania as well but had not
appeared by this time in England. Id. at 24.
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corporate stock.2 30
While Angell and Ames did not discuss the potential problems of cor-
porate abuses and shareholder rights, it is important to remember that
these were not really problems yet in the United States. Further, while
the previous British experiences with the South Sea Bubble in 1720 per-
haps should have indicated the need for treatment of such problems, men
including businessmen and lawyers (perhaps especially businessmen and
lawyers) have always had short memories, as has been evidenced over
and over throughout history.
C. CREATION OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
The authors next turned to the issue of creation of private corpora-
tions. Under civil law at this time, incorporation required the approbation
of the sovereign along with an explication of the usefulness and public
benefit of the intended corporation.231 Corporations historically had been
created without such direct assent and had been allowed to continue to
exist through the implied assent of the sovereign.2 32 In England, consent
was given either through a charter or an act of parliament, while assent
was implied through the common law or by prescription.233 While a few
early corporations in the United States existed by way of common law or
prescription as in England, in general corporations were created through
the state legislatures.2 34 Such state grants clearly were seen as not in con-
flict with any law of Congress or the Constitution of the United States. 235
As Coke stated, "[n]o precise form of words is necessary in the creation
of a corporation. '2 36 A grant, however, does require acceptance in order
for a corporation to be in fact created. 237 Once.accepted, though, "[a]
grant of incorporation is in fact in the nature of a contract between the
government and its subjects, the latter of whom undertake, in considera-
tion of the privileges bestowed, to do what the government is interested
in having done. '238 In other words, as previously stated, the public bene-
fit provides the necessary consideration to form a valid contract.2 39
230. 2 KENr, supra note 193, at 272.
231. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 5, at 37.
232. Id. at 37-38.
233. Id. at 38-40. Note once again the strong similarity to Coke's formulation in Sut-
ton's Hospital, supra, Partl.A.1.
234. "The state legislatures, in the United States, have for many years past, and in very
numerous instances, exercised the right of granting corporate privileges both to public and
to private companies." ANGELL & AMES, supra note 5, at 41.
235. "The competency of the legislative power of a State to create corporations, with
powers which are not repugnant to the constitution of the United States and the acts of
Congress, and which do not conflict with the powers of the general government, "is so
clear, so generally admitted, and has been so long and so often claimed and exercised, that
it is unnecessary to offer any arguments or authorities to establish it." Id. at 41; see also,
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (the federal government, as well as
the states, has the power to create corporations).
236. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 5, at 45.
237. Id. at 46-47.
238. Id. at 47.
239. See supra, Part II Dartmouth Coll.
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D. COMPOSITION OF THE CORPORATION
Next, the authors addressed composition of the corporation. First, a
corporation is composed of persons, either natural or as members of
other corporations. 240 Second, as related by Coke, every corporation
must have a name, in order for it "to sue and be sued, and do all legal
acts."'24' Third, a "corporation should be constituted of some place. '242
Given these attributes and a valid incorporation, a corporation automati-
cally had several incidents, and therefore they did not need to be stated in
the charter.243 The authors restated Kyd for the five necessary incidents
and the three essential capacities. 244 Accepting these as a point of begin-
ning, the authors stated that these powers and incidents could be and
often were, limited by the charter.245 Further, "[t]he general practice in
the United States is, to specify the powers with which it is intended to
endow the society or company incorporated; and these powers will be
found to be given in reference to the object ... of creating the corpora-
tion. '246 While this situation is not completely identical to the incidents of
the doctrine of ultra vires, it would seem a necessary predecessor.
Overall, then, despite their criticisms of Kyd, Angell and Ames relied
very heavily on his treatise. Further, most of their treatise only builds
slightly on what had been developed previously, dating back to Coke in
Sutton's Hospital Case. Interestingly, though, they treated limited liability
as a corporate incident, similar to the treatment accorded by Smith, with-
out any strong authority for their proposition. On that basis, it may be
argued that the strength of limited liability in the United States, may in
fact date to the first edition in 1832 of Angell and Ames, Treatise on the
Law of Private Corporations Aggregate.
IV. CONCLUSION
By 1832, the American business corporation had achieved the essential
form that it would possess for approximately the next fifty years. Given
this status, history indicates that American corporate law owes much to
the early English law on the subject. More importantly, however, corpo-
rate development in the United States appears to have been based on
purely American developments in the period after the Revolution and
especially after the institution of the United States Constitution in 1789.
Landmark opinions such as that of Justice Story in the Dartmouth College
case further strengthened the legal foundations of the American business
corporation. Finally, in 1832 with the publication of the Angell and Ames
treatise, the authors themselves probably influenced the later develop-
240. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 5, at 51.
241. Id. at 54.
242. Id. at 57.
243. Id. at 58.
244. Id. at 58-59 (citing I Kyd at 69-70).
245. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 5, at 59.
246. Id.
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ment of the law of business corporations in the United States, at least
through the majority of the subsequent fifty years, as much as any other
single factor, especially in the area of limited liability. To return to our
starting point, the development of the law of private corporations in the
United States was not planned, immediate or even uncontroversial, but
rather (in the tradition of the common law) a gradual building up of the
various supports necessary for the commercial and financial effectiveness
of the form. For those today seeking to advance the corporate (and
thereby economic) development in individual economies, the lesson to
draw should be to focus on the economic goals, needs and issues (e.g.,
corporate governance) and seek to put in place the legal structures neces-
sary to meet those needs and goals, while minimizing inherent difficulties.
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